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that encompass these requirements is just the accounting conservatism. Our article proposes an analysis of the 
themes treated in some of the most important papers on accounting conservatism developed previous to the 
adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) in the European area. We approached this 
topic being incited by the controversy on the elimination of the characteristic "prudence" of the financial 
information by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), within Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting in 2010. In this context, we consider it is necessary to review the previous papers on 
accounting conservatism, whereas only after an in-depth study we will understand if the IASB approach is that 
recommended for accounting regulators in the future. 
All the papers have been taken from the site http://scholar.google.ro. Among the works published on this 
site, we chose 26 papers of those which have had as high number of citations. All the reviews presented have 
been cited more than 60 times. For example, Ross Watts’ paper, 2003a presents a number of 1,678 citations and 
Ray Ball, SP Kothari and Ashok Robin’s paper, 1999 has been cited 2,576 times. Going through papers, we 
note that some present conceptual debates supported by methods for measuring accounting conservatism, others 
present just purely theoretical conceptual debates, and the most present studies on the measurement of 
accounting conservatism. We classified papers according to the topic approached by the authors. Thus, in the 
second part of the review there are presented several definitions and methods of determination and 
measurement of accounting conservatism, and in the third part there are presented papers treating conditional 
and unconditional conservatism. In the fourth part they rediscover papers which are considering alternative 
explanations for accounting conservatism: contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation and accounting 
regulation. In the fifth part there are presented papers on the level of accounting conservatism in varied legal 
settings: common-law-based countries versus code-law-based countries; and Great Britain versus USA. In the 
sixth part of the review we presented two papers treating the association of the conservatism with managerial 
ownership and the role of conservatism in the firm’s funding policy. In the seventh part, we present our 
conclusions related to the literature on accounting conservatism. 
2. Definition and measures of accounting conservatism 
Ross Watts, 2003b shows that it is contracting that stays at the origins of accounting, and this fact implies 
conservatism. Therefore, the occurrence of accounting conservatism lies in the early years of trade relations. 
Sudipta Basu, 1997 shows that there is evidence that ever since the fifteenth century, there have been  practices 
of accounting conservatism in the commercial partnerships. 
The first debate on accounting conservatism that we have identified, were those from 1939, of Stephen 
Gilman and Kenneth MacNeal. In their papers, the two discuss the question of asset valuation bases presented 
in the financial reports, on whom they disagreed. Stephen Gilman holds up the necessity of using historical cost 
and Kenneth MacNeal states that the assets should be presented at current market value as of the date of the 
statement. Stephen Gilman considers that it must not take into account the common accounting convention 
according to whom assets should be stated at the lower of cost or market values and appreciates this accounting 
practice as "distorting and unconservative". He doesn’t see the meaning of asset revaluation and proposes the 
return of the original cost. On the other hand, Kenneth MacNeal considers that balance sheets must disclose 
important information, namely they shall present the assets at their current market value and he presents several 
methods of determining it. At that time, Stephen Gilman's attitude was appreciated to be viable, it was 
considered that Kenneth MacNeal was doing nothing else than provoking controversy.  
In APB Statement No. 4, 1970 it is mentioned the reason that led to the convention of conservatism: choice 
over time, predominantly, of understatement of income and assets by managers, investors, and accountants. In 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 2, 1980 developed by Financial Accounting Statements Board 
(FASB), conservatism is defined as "a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties and 
risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered”. 
1116   Ramona Neag and Ema Mașca /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  1114 – 1121 
Feltham and Ohlson, 1995 defined accounting conservatism as the persistence in underestimating the book 
value of the firm, implying that book value is less than market value. Essentially, in this paper, Gerald A. 
Feltham and James A. Ohlson, 1995 analyse the relationship between accrual accounting and valuation of a 
firm's equity and goodwill. The authors define several concepts, including operating activity, market value, 
book value, abnormal earnings, goodwill, firm's equity. They begin by treating operating and financial activities 
in terms of firm's market value and accounting date. Financial activity runs under a perfect market, therefore the 
financial activity does not imply differences between book value and market value. But operating activity 
implies assets functioning in association with accounting for accruals conventions, which determines a firm's 
inequality between a firm’s market and book values (the goodwill). The two types of activities (operating and 
financial) interact because of cash flows and are independent of dividends policy. Regarding operating activity, 
they took into account three variables - accounting conservatism, persistence of abnormal earnings and growth - 
and developed a linear model for the evolution of book value and abnormal earnings. Developing linear model 
on multiple types of analysis highlights the fact that not impartiality, but accounting conservatism is the one 
who decides the absence / presence of growth and conclusions of studies. 
Sudipta Basu, 1997 argues for another definition of accounting conservatism, respectively “earnings 
reflecting bad news more quickly than good news”. To illustrate his argumentation, he gives the example of 
changes in estimating amortization period of a fixed asset. In his example, he considers both increase and 
decrease of the amortization period of the asset and the effects of these changes on net asset and on results. The 
author doesn’t limit to redefine accounting conservatism and demonstrates the optimistic attitude of the market 
when unexpected events: earnings declines have more likely to be temporary and earnings increases are more 
likely to be persistent. In addition, Sudipta Basu demonstrates that in the recent decades, conservatism level has 
increased because the sensitivity of earnings to concurrent positive returns has decreased relative to the 
sensitivity of earnings to concurrent negative returns. 
Richard Dietrich, Karl Muller and Edward Riedl, 2006 oppose to the Sudipta Basu's research the argument 
that the test statistics is biased, which does not allow measurement of conservatism by this method. These 
biases arise from the resulting distributional properties of the truncated samples and the sample formation 
procedure. The authors emphasize that not the asymmetric timeliness but the research design determines 
erroneous results. 
Stephen G. Ryan, 2006 taking into account the reasoning of Dietrich Muller and Riedl, 2006, upholds Basu's 
argument, 1997 that the asymmetric timeliness is the most important manifestation of conditional conservatism 
and asymmetric timeliness assessment involves variation of bad and good news related to earnings. Giorgio 
Gotti, 2008 continues Basu’s research and combats Dietrich, Muller and Riedl, 2006; introduces a new measure 
of conditional conservatism by means of which he explains the accounting conservatism. He sees bad news 
about future earnings as quickly as good news in the firms which have high debt-to-asset ratio; directors 
rewarding based on accounting performance of the firm determines an aggressive accounting behavior - 
recognizing expected gains in annual earnings faster than losses; a more conditional conservative behavior is 
rediscovered in firms that received an unexplained unqualified auditor opinion. 
Dan Givoly, Carla Hayn and Ashok Natarajan, 2006 examines the extent to which the measure developed by 
Basu, 1997 - the differential timeliness, evaluates accounting conservatism. The authors mention some factors 
that may influence this measure: application of conservative accounting methods underestimate asset valuation 
application application of the lower-of-cost-or-market convention. 
The measure developed by Basu is invalidated not only highlights the possible causes of measurement error, 
considering that dependence on a single measure for assessing the accounting conservatism is not 
recommended. 
Sugata Roychowdhury and Ross Watts, 2004 examine the links between several forms of measurement of 
accounting conservatism. Regarding association between asymmetric timeliness of earnings and market-to-
book ratio, the following issues were found: especially for firms experiencing negative returns, this association 
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is negative; regarding firms that have registered positive results, respectively a high market-to-book ratio, in the 
past, have postponed their earnings. The analysis was based on the non-recognition and respective the 
asymmetric recognition of two common factors for the future asymmetric timeliness of earnings and the 
market-to-book ratio: the changes in rents and the changes in the value of separable assets. The authors warn 
that using asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure implies taking into account differences in the investment 
opportunity set across in each country. 
3. Conditional and unconditional conservatism 
In their paper since 1968, Ray Ball and Philip Brown speak about expected and unexpected income change 
and about the relation between the effects of information submitted and conditional expectation regarding the 
actual change in income. William Beaver and Stephen Ryan, 2005 define conservatism and present its two 
forms. Conditional conservatism (ex post conservatism or news dependent) - means that under favorable 
circumstances book values are not written up (conservative behavior), but under unfavorable circumstances 
book values are written down. Unconditional conservatism (or ex ante conservatism, or news independent) - 
means that the accounting process determined at the inception of assets and liabilities yield expected 
unrecorded goodwill. They developed models which captured the interaction between the two types of 
conservatism, how conditional conservatism is influenced by unconditional conservatism and by other factors 
and the asymmetric response of earnings to positive and negative share returns. In the same year 2005, Sudipta 
Basu analyzed the work of Beaver and Ryan, 2005 and published its appreciations: discussed about the quality 
of substitute of unconditional and conditional conservatism, saying that these are more than that; he analyzed 
the differences between the simpler theoretical models and the accounting practice. Furthermore, in his paper 
since 2006, Ryan showed the nature of the conditional conservatism and did a literature review of the 
conditional conservatism. The author analyzed the limitations of the mentioned method and proposed other 
ways to measure conditional conservatism. 
Joachim Gassen, Rolf Uwe Fülbier and Thorsten Sellhorn, 2006) studied the relation between conditional 
conservatism on the one hand and unconditional conservatism and income smoothing, on the other hand. Then 
they showed that the two attributes of earnings - income smoothing and conditional conservatism are 
fundamentally different because they got different distributions of the results: increasing the importance of 
funding leads to increasing the conditional conservatism and increasing the importance of the dividends leads to 
income smoothing. 
In 2007, Juan Manuel Garcia Lara, Beatriz Garcia Osma and Fernando Penalva, starting from Basu’s 
definition of accounting conservatism 1997, investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism - 
conditional conservatism – and influence of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on the functioning of the Board of 
Directors. To do this, they used several features of the board of directors: number of members, percentage of 
non-executive directors, percentage of independent directors, if chairman of the board cumulates also the 
position of executive director, number of Board of Directors meetings, the existence of an audit department etc. 
They found that the accounting information provided by conditional conservatism is used as instruments of 
government by some strong boards. In 2011, Juan Manuel Garcia Lara, Beatriz Garcia Osma and Fernando 
Penalva showed that there was a negative relationship between conditional conservatism and cost of social 
capital and discussed the need to keep conservatism as a feature of information provided by financial reporting: 
presence of accounting conservatism leads to more precise firm disclosure. 
4. Alternative explanations for conservatism 
Ross Watts, 2003a debates the implications of accounting conservatism on accounting regulators. He 
considers alternative explanations for accounting conservatism: contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and 
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accounting regulation. He believes that the importance of the verification and the problems conservatism's 
asymmetric verification face must be recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Such an attitude from the FASB would lead to improving the 
financial reporting. In part II of this paper, Ross Watts, 2003b brings empirical evidence on increasing the 
accounting conservatism over time and alternative explanation ability to demonstrate the existence of 
accounting conservatism. Moreover, Watts shows that both the evolution of accounting and financial reporting 
and the manipulation and fraud are influenced by that accounting's effects on managerial behavior. 
Xinrong Qiang, 2007 analyzes the two forms of conservatism and finds that conditional conservatism is 
decreased by unconditional conservatism and that the two forms of conservatism meet different needs of firms. 
Conditional conservatism is induced by contracting and litigation and unconditional conservatism is induced by 
litigation, regulation and taxation. Thus, litigation is the only alternative explanation, which induces both forms 
of conservatism. Juan Manuel Garcia Lara, Beatriz Garcia Osma and Fernando Penalva, 2009 continue Qiang’s 
research and find that conditional conservatism may be determined also by taxation and regulation. Moreover, 
they demonstrate that sometimes the transfer of profits toward periods of lower taxes is stimulated by 
incentives, taxation and regulation. There are analyzed two forms of transfer of profits: recognizing current 
economic losses (which, according to aggressive reporting policy, wouldn’t have been recognized); and delay in 
recognizing current economic earnings (which, according to aggressive reporting policy, wouldn’t have been 
recognized). 
5. Accounting conservatism in varied legal settings 
Juan Manuel García Lara and Araceli Mora, 2004 studied accounting conservatism in European countries, 
focusing on institutional difference between common-law-based countries (UK) and code-law-based or 
continental countries. In terms of earnings conservatism, no significant differences were found between the two 
categories of countries; only in Germany there were found such statistically significant differences. In addition, 
their results show that the balance sheet conservatism influences earnings conservatism in the meaning of its 
decrease: a reduced level of earnings conservatism is associated with balance sheet conservative practices. 
Juan Manuel Garcia Lara, Beatriz Garcia Osma and Araceli Mora, 2005, continued their research since the 
previous year on the relationship between earnings management and accounting conservatism in common-law 
than in code-law based accounting regimes. This time, they took into account also discretionary accruals and 
found that: earnings conservatism decreases in France and Germany after removing the effect of discretionary 
accruals; in common-law-based countries (United Kingdom), earnings management coordinates the measures of 
earnings conservatism. In conclusion, after removing the effect of discretionary accruals, the assumptions since 
2004 have been proved correct: in the so-called common-law-based countries or Anglo-Saxon countries (United 
Kingdom), earnings conservatism is more pronounced; and in the so-called code-law-based countries or 
'continental' countries, balance sheet conservatism.  
Ray Ball, S.P. Kothari and Ashok Robin, 1999 show that since accounting conservatism is higher in the 
common-law-based countries, in the states with this accounting regime, earnings management is more difficult 
to be done than in the code-law-based countries. In the common-law-based countries, sensitivity to economic 
loss is more pronounced than in the code-law-based countries. This high level of sensitivity to economic loss, 
determines managers' incentives also high, leading to closer monitoring of managers by security analysts. 
Therefore, the pressure on managers who benefit incentives is higher in the common-law-based countries, 
which determined the development, in these countries, of accounting rules sets with a higher level of 
accounting conservatism. 
Ryan Lafond and Sugata Roychowdhury, 2007 starting from Basu’s definition of accounting conservatism 
1997, found a negative association between managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Whereas 
through accounting conservatism agency problems can be solved, arising from greater separation between 
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ownership and control, decrease of the managerial property induce the need for accounting conservatism. 
Starting from the definition of conservatism given by Basu, 1997, Peter Pope and Martin Walker, 1999 
analyzed the differences of conservatism between the financial reporting system in the US and UK GAAP. 
They took into account differences in the timeliness of income recognition according to bad news and good 
news. For "news" there were used changes in market value, as they were considered by firms: bad or good 
news. They also found that the extraordinary items in the composition of accounting earnings affect accounting 
conservatism in the US and UK. They took into account the high pressure of the incentives granted to managers 
by British companies to exclude negative news from the composition of earnings and to classify them as 
extraordinary items. The level of accounting conservatism after extraordinary items was higher in the US and 
the level of accounting conservatism before extraordinary items was higher in the UK. Moreover, the authors 
found that both earnings timeliness and earnings conservatism are affected by common-law or code-law based 
accounting regimes. We note that the topic on accounting conservatism development in common-law-based 
countries and code-law based countries has been continued and widely debated in Paul André and Andrei 
Filip’s papers,  2012, respective Paul André, Andrei Filip and Luc Paugam’s papers, 2013. In these papers, the 
authors analyze how accounting conservatism evolved in Europe, under the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
different legal and institutional frameworks: code law countries, common law countries. They found that the 
level of conservatism in Europe decreased after adoption of IFRS. 
6. The role of accounting conservatism in the organization  
Anwer S. Ahmed and Scott Duellman, 2007 complete LaFond and Roychowdhury’s research, 2007 and find 
a negative association between managerial ownership and accounting conservatism and a positive association 
between ownership of external managers and accounting conservatism. The relationship between a firm and its 
managers who do not have a significant equity stake is established by contracts. Contracts, by the clauses they 
contain, can regulate or alleviate to some extent, conflicts arising between these two parties. In general, 
conflicts are caused just by this asymmetry of control: managers do not hold shares in firms whose assets they 
control. However, contracts are not perfect, therefore they cannot eliminate conflicts. In fact, contracts, the 
more complex, the more expensive they are. Under these conditions, there appeared corporate governance 
mechanisms that are more expensive or cheaper, more efficient or not (board of directors, managerial 
ownership, etc.). For each firm it is looked for the optimal combination of governance mechanisms, so that the 
cost - benefit ratio to be as favorable. Among the benefits we call: market value of the firm, firm’s results etc. 
Anwer Ahmed, Bruce Billings, Richard Morton and Mary Stanford-Hars, 2002 found how accounting 
conservatism can be associated with the mitigation of conflicts arising from dividend policy and how 
accounting conservatism determines reducing firm’s costs of debt. They measured accounting conservatism 
basing on market and accruals. 
7. Conclusions 
We note that beginning with 1995 accounting conservatism has aroused a particular interest. All the 
presented papers have signaled the presence of accounting conservatism in varying degrees, none of them 
mentions its lack. Most often, the topics approached in the research of accounting conservatism have not been 
exhausted in a single paper, but transmitted over years from one author to another and from one paper to 
another. Sometimes, researchers have followed paths that although they have been proved viable in their study, 
they have not been validated by economic reality, thing signaled by those who subsequently resumed the 
respective topics. 
The general context of the research of this feature of financial reporting as that in which it is signaled the 
presence of accounting conservatism in varying degrees, without questioning its necessity. Accounting 
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conservatism approaches are numerous and its definitions sometimes complement each other, sometimes ideas 
are resumed under different expressions. Between measures of accounting conservatism, it seems obvious the 
method provided by Basu, 1997 although as we have seen, some researchers canceled this method (Richard 
Dietrich, Karl Muller and Edward Riedl, 2006 and others presented its limitations (Dan Givoly, Carla Hayn and 
Ashok Natarajan, 2006). Whereas afterwards, many researchers began their work based on the definition and 
methods of determination of accounting conservatism developed by Sudipta Basu 1997, we consider that this 
contribution was critical for accounting conservatism research. 
Some papers treated definition and determination of conditional and unconditional conservatism, while 
others took into account the interaction between the two forms of accounting conservatism. Professionals’ 
approach is complemented by studies on the association of conditional conservatism with other features of the 
organization: income smoothing, funding policy, dividend policy of firms, the cost of social capital, CEO 
influence on the functioning of the Board of Directors. 
Alternative explanations for conservatism concern: contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation and 
accounting regulation. They are on the one hand the players of accounting conservatism and on the other hand, 
they represent its forms of manifestations. The research topics constituted the association of a form of 
accounting conservatism with each one of the four explanations; as well as the association between earnings 
management and the four explanations of accounting conservatism. 
In all the papers it was found that accounting conservatism has evolved differently in varied legal settings: 
common-law-based countries versus code-law-based countries; and UK versus US. However, with the adoption 
of IFRS in European countries, we expect to a decrease and smoothing in the level of accounting conservatism, 
and some studies have already proved it (Paul André and Andrei Filip, 2012, Paul André, Andrei Filip and Luc 
Paugam, 2013, Irina Paúcan, 2014 ). 
Whereas in this field the literature is vast, our review has not exhausted the topic of its revisal, as we didn’t 
propose to do this in these few pages. Thus, there are not presented here the relationships between accounting 
conservatism and earning management, income smoothing, debt contracts or auditors. 
Following the standardization of accounting at European level, we believe that many of these topics will be 
resumed by researchers in their studies. 
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